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Abstract—Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a promising ap-
proach for enabling cloud-computing capabilities at the edge
of cellular networks. Nonetheless, security is becoming an in-
creasingly important issue in MEC-based applications. In this
paper, we propose a deep-learning-based model to detect security
threats. The model uses unsupervised learning to automate the
detection process, and uses location information as an important
feature to improve the performance of detection. Our proposed
model can be used to detect malicious applications at the edge of
a cellular network, which is a serious security threat. Extensive
experiments are carried out with 10 different datasets, the results
of which illustrate that our deep-learning-based model achieves
an average gain of 6% accuracy compared with state-of-the-art
machine learning algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile edge computing (MEC) is often referred to as a
plausible approach to reduce end-to-end delay by moving
cloud-computing capabilities to the edge [1]. In addition, MEC
can provide location awareness services for cellular-network-
based applications. While MEC is becoming an increasingly
popular computing paradigm for dynamic systems/scenarios,
new types of vulnerabilities, especially those that can come
from the edge network itself, are also becoming serious
concerns. For instance, when an edge customer connects with
the closest edge computing device to access a service in a
certain location, an attacker can tamper with the address of
the currently connected edge computing device stored with
the edge customer, to possibly interrupt the connection. Such
manipulations are location-aware. Detecting such attacks and
associating them with the locations of their origins are both
important.
Moreover, such attacks can result in extra energy consump-
tion. Tampering with the address of the closest connected edge
computing device to disconnect the edge customer from its
closest edge computing device is a typical example of such
an attack. The edge customer in this case has to connect to a
remote edge computing device, thus resulting in extra energy
consumption of the network connection. Based on the above
description, the research problem is illustrated in Figure 1. An
edge customer in location A attempts to connect to the closest
edge computing device 1, but the connection is ineffective
because of the attack. As the customer moves, it attempts to
connect to the closest edge computing device 2 in location B.
Because the attack takes place in location A, not in location
B, the connection to edge computing device 2 is successful.
To detect this attack, the detection method needs location
information to automate the detection process.
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In order to detect such attacks, we introduce a deep-
learning-based model. As an example, the introduced model
is used to detect the malicious application on Android de-
vices [2], which is a kind of serious security threat for mobile
devices in the MEC environment. Using machine learning
algorithms to detect such malicious attacks, requires extracting
features from the applications. The state of the art provides
quite a good volume of work in this direction. DynaLog [3]
is a dynamic analysis framework that automatically extracts
dynamic behaviors (features) of applications for further pro-
cessing. The authors in [4] presented a dynamic framework
called Andromaly that applies several different machine learn-
ing algorithms to classify applications. MADAM [5] is also
a dynamic analysis framework that uses machine learning to
classify applications. It extracted 13 features at the user and
kernel levels. Marvin [6] combined static and dynamic analysis
and applied machine learning techniques to assess the risk of
unknown applications. Crowdroid [7] is a cloud-based machine
learning framework for malicious application detection.
However, the existing work has not considered the location
information related to the attack that can be exploited to learn
more about it, and thus detect the attack in an autonomous
manner. In this paper, we propose a deep-learning-based model
to detect malicious applications while also incorporating the
location information into the detection framework. For adapt-
ing the dynamic computing paradigm, this model uses a deep
belief network to automatically extract and learn the features
of malicious applications, and then, by classification technique,
the model can detect whether an application is malicious or
not in a certain location with the help of the features. We
compare the performance of our proposed model with four
widely adopted machine learning algorithms, and illustrate the
gain offered by our model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we review the existing efforts on machine-learning-
based malicious application detection. In Section III, we de-
scribe the proposed deep-learning-based model. In Section IV,
we compare the performance of four widely used machine
learning algorithms with the proposed model. Section V con-
cludes the paper.
II. MACHINE-LEARNING-BASED DETECTION: STATE OF
THE ART
Existing malicious application detection schemes can
mainly be classified into two categories.
1) Static analysis examines the source code of applications
without executing them. It analyzes the static features
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Fig. 1: In mobile edge computing, an edge customer is connected to the closest edge computing device to obtain a service.
As the edge customer moves, it will connect to a different edge computing device. Location information is a feature to be
incorporated in the detection algorithm to enhance the performance of detecting attacks in the location-aware MEC environment.
extracted from the source code to learn malicious pat-
terns of applications. With such learning, it is possible
to know the malicious behaviors, and then to avoid
malicious attacks. The static features of applications
include permissions, used hardware components, and
data-flow usage.
2) Dynamic analysis examines applications in a running
environment, and monitors the dynamic behavior of
applications. The dynamic features include network con-
nections, system calls, and resource usage. Such analysis
is conducted in the running status of an application to
analyze the dynamic behavior of the application, for
instance, analyzing which networks an application will
connect during the period of running.
In both kinds of schemes, the data are collected to train
machine learning classifiers to model benign and malicious
features of the applications, and then the trained model detects
malicious applications.
A. Static Analysis
DERBIN [8] is a method for the detection of Android
malicious applications on smart phones. It is a static analysis
framework that extracts a set of features from the document
AndroidManifest.xml and the disassembled code of applica-
tions. In DERBIN, a support vector machine was applied to
learn the difference between benign and malicious applica-
tions. Droidmat [9] detects malicious applications by analyzing
AndroidManifest.xml and tracing system calls. It depends on
static analysis for the Android applications’ permissions, com-
ponents, intent messages, and API calls. Droidmat extracts dif-
ferent features from the document AndroidManifest.xml, and
then it applies the k-means algorithm to model malicious appli-
cations, while the number of clusters is determined by singular
value decomposition. In [10], the authors deployed decision-
tree-, k-nearest-neighbor-, Bayesian-network-, random-forest-
, and support-vector-machine-based algorithms for automatic
Android application categorization and malicious application
detection. With that, the authors indicated that the Bayesian
network is a better classifier compared with those based on
a random forest and decision tree. In [11], a system was
built up by training a support vector machine classifier with
the extracted static feature from Android applications, namely
permissions.
B. Dynamic Analysis
Shabtai et al., [4] proposed an artificial-neural-network-
based system to detect unknown Android malicious applica-
tions based on analyzing the applications’ permissions and
system calls. In this work, two types of artificial neural
networks were used: feedforward neural networks were used
for training the model that builds distinguishable patterns
between benign and malicious applications, and the training is
conducted with the requested permissions of the applications;
the recurrent neural networks were used to train the model
with the system calls of the benign applications’ execution
behavior. Crowdroid [7] applies k-means on the vectors of
system’s calls. It can distinguish the applications that have
the same name and version, but different behavior, in the An-
droid platform. AntiMalDroid [12] is an application-behavior-
signature-based detection framework that deploys the support
vector machine algorithm. It can detect malicious applications
and variants in runtime by analyzing the dynamic behavior
of malicious applications, and it can extend the characteristic
3database of malicious applications dynamically. Table I shows
the overview of existing machine-learning-based schemes for
detecting malicious applications.
In the existing work, location information is not considered
as a feature to conduct detection. Location information is im-
portant for the location-aware computing paradigm, MEC, to
improve the detection accuracy. We propose a deep-learning-
based model to detect malicious applications, which can incor-
porate location information to improve detection performance.
The model uses location information as an important feature
that is used, together with other features, as the input of a
deep belief network to conduct model training.
We compare our model with other four machine learning
algorithms, and these four algorithms have different process
features:
• Decision tree. A decision tree incrementally constructs
an associated decision tree by breaking down a dataset
into smaller subsets. Even if more data are added and the
data size is increased, the construction process is similar.
Such adding and increasing cannot always help increase
the accuracy of the decision tree. In Figure 3, for the
decision tree, the accuracy value is smaller at 500/5000
compared with that at 500/4500.
• Random forest. A random forest is constructed by a
multitude of decision trees, and outputs the classes
(classification) or mean prediction (regression) of the
individual trees. Forest construction can be reduced to
the construction of multiple trees, and thus is similar to a
decision tree, in that even if more data are added and the
data size is increased, it cannot always help to increase
the accuracy of the random forest. For example, for the
random forest, the accuracy value is smaller at 500/2500
compared with that at 500/2000.
• Softmax regression. Softmax regression parameters are
trained to minimize a cost function, and it is a single-layer
artificial neural network for linearly separable datasets;
however, the datasets used in our study are not linearly
separable.
• Support vector machine. In a support vector machine,
the kernel function is the core of determining the per-
formance, not data-based training.
The deep-learning-based model mainly offers two advan-
tages: (i) Improvement of detection accuracy, and (ii) flexi-
bility. Regarding the improvement of detection accuracy, the
proposed deep-learning-based model benefits from data-based
model training. The data from the application have enough
information to reflect the complicated relationship among all
parameters of the application. Regarding flexibility, in the
deep-learning-based model it is easy to add new features to
satisfy the requirements from more complex application sce-
narios, e.g., adding the location feature as an input parameter.
It is easy to add new modules to develop new functions,
e.g., using the unsupervised learning function of a deep belief
network to automate the feature learning process. This means
that it is not necessary to manually set the relationship between
feature values and a malicious application, e.g., if feature A=1,
the application is malicious; otherwise, it is benign.
III. DEEP-LEARNING-BASED MODEL
We design a deep-learning-based model to detect security
threats, and as an example, we use our model to detect the
malicious Android application which is a kind of serious
security threat in cellular networks. For instance, an Android
application includes malicious code to threaten network secu-
rity.
This model consists of two components: a feature prepro-
cessing engine and a malicious application detection engine.
Feature Preprocessing Engine. To characterize the applica-
tions (both malicious and benign), static and dynamic analyses
are conducted to preprocess the features for each application.
The features fall into one of three types: required permissions,
sensitive APIs, and dynamic behavior. Required permissions
and sensitive APIs are processed through static analysis, and
the dynamic behavior is processed through dynamic analysis.
In the feature preprocessing engine, APK files from the
edge devices of MEC are unpacked first, and then the feature
elements that will be used as the input of the malicious
application detection engine are extracted from the unpacked
files. Taking the permissions feature as an example, for a
special application, if a kind of “permission” is used, it is
recorded as 1; otherwise, it is recorded as 0. This creates a
two-dimensional array of bits. Lastly, these two-dimensional
arrays are stored into JSON files.
Malicious Application Detection Engine. There are two
parts in this engine: deep-belief-network-based feature learn-
ing and softmax-function-based prediction output.
This engine develops a deep belief network to automatically
learn the features of malicious applications. The structure of
the deep belief network is illustrated in Figure 2 (right half).
The deep belief network can be viewed as a compos-
ite of simple and unsupervised networks such as restricted
Boltzmann machines (RBMs) [13] 1. Multi-RBMs are stacked
together, and the output from the hidden layer of the prior
RBM is provided as the input of the next RBM. Moreover,
the input of the first RBM layer is unlabeled samples from the
MEC environment2. A set of features is used as the unlabeled
samples to be fed as the input to the visible units of the
RBM layer. The features are extracted from the document
AndroidManifest.xml and the log files of edge devices, which
are used to analyze the difference of the behavior between
malicious and benign applications. In addition to location
information, the following features are used:
INVOKE INTERNAL HANDLER,
ACCESS NORTON SECURITY,
READ FRAME BUFFER, WRITE GMAIL,
READ PROFILE, WAVE LOCK,
ACCESS WIMAX STATE, VIBRATION, ACCESS GPS,
ACCESS COARSE UPDATES, READ PROFILE,
ACCESS WIMAX STATE, ACCESS COARSE UPDATES,
1An RBM is a generative stochastic artificial neural network that can learn
probability distribution over its set of inputs, and it is comprised of one-layer
visible units, one-layer hidden units, and weights between the visible units
and the hidden units.
2The label that is used to label a feature denotes that the feature is from a
malicious or benign application.
4TABLE I: Machine-learning-based malicious application detection: Summary of state of the art
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Support Vector Machine J. Sahs et al. [11]
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Two Types of Artificial Neural Networks: Feedforward Neural Networks and Recurrent Neural Networks Shabtai et al. [4]
K-Means Algorithm I. Burguera et al. [7]
Support Vector Machine M. Zhao et al. [12]
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Fig. 2: Structure of the deep belief network, and network training with the samples from the MEC environment.
INSTALL THEME, RECEIVE BROADCASTS,
ACCESS GPS, READ INPUT STATE, WAVE LOCK,
ACCESS NORTON SECURITY, and UNLOCK.
On the top of the deep belief network, there are hidden and
top-level units that construct the back-propagation network,
which can be used to achieve the fine-tuning of deep learning,
and labeled samples are used as input to conduct supervised
learning.
There are two phases in the training of this deep belief
network:
i) Unsupervised pre-training with unlabeled samples (loca-
tion information has been added into these samples). The
contrastive divergence (CD) algorithm [14] is applied to
develop the RBM based training, and its main steps are
summarized in Algorithm 1.
ii) Supervised fine-tuning with labeled samples. Back prop-
Algorithm 1 Contrastive Divergence
1: procedure :
2: initialize visible units;
3: update hidden units according to the input from the
visible units;
4: reconstruct the visible units following the output of
the hidden units;
5: re-update the hidden units according to the recon-
structed visible units;
6: update the weights between visible units and hidden
units;
agation is used to finely tune the pre-trained parameters
that were trained in the pre-training phase. Back prop-
agation is a method used in artificial neural networks
to calculate the error contribution of each neuron. It
5is used by an optimization model to tune the weight
of each neuron. It calculates the gradient of the loss
function 3, and it is commonly used in the gradient
descent optimization model. It is also called backward
propagation of errors, because the error is calculated
at the output and distributed back through the network
layers. Back propagation requires a known output for
each input value, so it is considered as a supervised
learning method. The input of the back propagation is
the labeled samples from the MEC environment.
The entire deep belief network is trained when learning for
the final hidden layer is executed. The structure of training the
deep belief network is shown in the left-hand part of Figure 2.
With data-based model training, the model will be more
suitable for the current application where the data come from.
In a real-world application, there is a large number of inter-
dependent parameters, making it either impossible or at least
extremely difficult to model a system with simple formulations
while also capturing the essence of the interdependencies. On
the other hand, the data from the application have enough
information to reflect the complicated relationship among all
interdependent parameters, thereby using the data facilitates
training of an artificial neural network to form a rich model
that can properly reflect the dependencies.
The strengths of the model are listed as follows:
i) We developed a deep learning model to capture the
non-linear and complicated relations between features
and malicious applications. Compared with the other
four algorithms, deep learning shows its most power-
ful intrinsic property, named feature learning [15]. The
process of learning the relationship between features and
a malicious application is automated with unsupervised
learning. However, in the four state-of-the-art algorithms,
designing a good feature adapter requires a considerable
amount of effort. To this end, automated learning of the
features using a general purpose learning algorithm, is
the key advantage of deep learning.
ii) The deep-learning architecture has a multi-layer stack of
modules to compute the non-linear input-output mapping.
Each module in the stack transforms its input to increase
both the selectivity and invariance of the representation.
With multiple non-linear layers, it is possible to develop
an extremely intricate function of input.
In the output layer of the malicious application detection
engine, the output of the deep belief network is used as
the input of the softmax function to obtain the output. The
output of the softmax function can be used to represent a
categorical distribution. It is a probability distribution over
different possible outcomes. In our case, the output represents
a category: output=1 means malicious and output=0 means
benign.
In the datasets that are used for experiments of this
paper, we have 500 samples from 500 malicious applica-
tions, for instance, air.BuyukCevsen, air.CevsenulKebir, and
3For back propagation, the loss function calculates the difference between
the network output and its expected output after a case propagates through
the network.
air.com.intersanyazilim.RMZAndroid. Our model can be used
in these applications at least to conduct detection.
IV. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
A. Experimental Setup
We used 10 different datasets for evaluating the performance
of our model. The datasets used include 500 malicious ap-
plication samples, and the number of benign applications is
varied as 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000,
4500, and 5000. For each dataset, the ratio of the data samples
used to train and test are 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. Moreover,
we compared the performance of our proposed deep-learning-
based model with four standard machine learning algorithms
widely used for detecting malicious applications: decision
tree, random forest, softmax regression, and support vector
machine. Each algorithm was run 10 times to obtain average
values for the performance.
For the proposed deep-learning-based model, we deployed
an RBM with 512 hidden units (in its hidden layer; the value
512 is obtained by training based adjustment), and the number
of visible units in the RBM is equal to the number of input
features. Moreover, to train the model, the number of iterative
epochs of the pre-training phase was 200, and the number of
iterative epochs of the fine-tuning phase was set as 200.
B. Experimental Results
In this subsection, we show three kinds of experimental
results: (i) accuracy comparison of five algorithms on 10
datasets (Figure 3), (ii) accuracy distribution over 10 iterations
for each algorithm (Figure 4), and (iii) pre-training errors on
different training epochs (Figure 5) and fine-tuning losses on
different training epochs (Figure 6).
In these results, accuracy is the measurement of how well
an algorithm can detect the malicious applications. It is the
proportion of all samples that are correctly classified, i.e.,
accuracy:= number of correctly classified samplestotal number of samples . Accuracy distribu-
tion displays the distributed situation of the accuracy over 10
iterations. For model training, in the pre-training phase, the
mean-squared error measures the error from training RBMs
with unlabeled samples, so it is the error on training with data,
and in the fine-tuning phase, the categorical cross-entropy loss
is used to measure the accuracy of classification.
From Figure 3, it is clear that the proposed deep-learning-
based model outperforms four other state-of-the-art algorithms
in terms of the accuracy of detection. It has 12.61% higher
accuracy compared with softmax regression, 5.76% gain com-
pared with decision tree, 3.20% gain compared with support
vector machine, and 2.61% gain compared with random for-
est. Moreover, by increasing size of the dataset, the model
can realize better training to enhance the performance even
further, whereas the four other algorithms do not show such
dependency on the size of the dataset.
From Figure 4, we can see that the accuracy distribution
of the deep-learning-based model is almost always above the
distributions of the four other algorithms.
Figure 5 clearly shows the model error after pre-training. It
initially decreases with an increase in the number of epochs,
6Fig. 3: Accuracy comparison of five algorithms on 10 datasets.
The result on a dataset is the average of 10 runs for each al-
gorithm. The sample ratio is the proportional relation between
malicious and benign samples. For example, 500/1000 means
that there are 500 malicious samples and 1000 benign samples.
Fig. 4: Accuracy distribution over 10 iterations for each
algorithm. In this boxplot, the wider box indicates more stable
accuracy for 10 iterations.
but after a certain time the error starts increasing, indicating
that a certain epoch yields the minimum training error. Upon
increasing the training epoch, the training data are fitted into
the model to let the model learn the features of the data.
The accuracy of the model is increased by such learning, but
training longer than a certain duration starts increasing the
error instead.
Figure 6 shows that the loss in the fine-tuning stage
decreases (although with some oscillations as the training
duration increases). In this training, there is the overfitting
problem.
C. Discussion
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the generic insights
into the challenges of deep-learning-based detection methods.
Challenges: In this study, the most significant and crit-
ical challenge is handling streaming and fast-moving input
Fig. 5: Pre-training errors on different epochs. When
epoch=50, the error reaches the minimum, and the effect of
the pre-training is the best.
Fig. 6: Fine-tuning losses on different epochs. After
epoch=350, the change in the loss value is very small.
data and to use these data to train the deep-learning-based
model. This challenge has two important aspects: (i) streaming
and fast-moving data processing; and (ii) streaming-data-
based model training. In MEC, with the movement of mo-
bile devices, streaming-data handling is an important ability
to prevent and control attacks from malicious applications.
Moreover, it is time-consuming to train a deep-learning-based
model, and it is important to train it online and to use it in
real-time applications.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a deep-learning-based
model to detect malicious attacks in a mobile edge computing
environment. The automated feature learning characteristic of
the deep-learning-based model was shown to be a significant
advantage in terms of improving the accuracy of the mali-
cious application detection rate compared with state-of-the-art
machine-learning-based algorithms. Moreover, we observed
that the size of the training dataset plays an important role
in further enhancing the accuracy of the deep-learning-based
7detection method. On average, the accuracy of the proposed
deep-learning-based model is 12.61% higher compared with
softmax regression, 5.76% higher compared with decision tree,
3.20% higher compared with support vector machine, and
2.61% higher compared with random forest.
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